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Distinguishing a minimalist  




A major theoretical shortcoming in international relations (IR) is the lack of any semblance of 
a common understanding regarding the role of grand theory. This article argues that explicit 
theoretical work of this sort is useful, but that a search for a single overarching grand theory to 
guide inquiry is misguided and that the primary business of IR is to form and evaluate middle-range 
theories.
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International relations (IR) scholars have long differentiated between a general form of 
theorizing and a specific one. The so-called ‘grand theories’ in IR offer ‘organizing 
devices for the entire field, not only portions of it’.1 In contrast, the ‘middle-range theo-
ries’ in IR have a more limited range; they aim to ‘explore specific problems, to form 
hypotheses or generalizations explaining limited ranges of phenomena’.2 A hallmark of 
the IR field during the post-WWII period is how much attention it devoted to grand theo-
rizing – that is, the development, refinement, and evaluation of grand theories. In this 
respect, IR stood in marked contrast to comparative politics, where the formative leaders 
of the field emphasized ‘middle-range theoretical propositions based on a keen aware-
ness of contingencies and contextual effects within different national settings’.3
During the 2000s, however, the salience of grand theorizing declined greatly within 
the IR field.4 This raises an important question: how much emphasis should be placed on 
grand theorizing in the years ahead? My read of Justin Rosenberg’s stimulating, 
provocative, and welcome recent article is that his answer to this question is, ‘much more 
Corresponding author:






86 International Relations 31(1)
attention’. But behind this initial question lies a deeper one: what is the proper function 
of grand theorizing within IR? To help further dialogue, this article aims to sketch a suc-
cinct answer to this question.
A major theoretical shortcoming in IR is the lack of any semblance of a common 
understanding regarding the role of grand theory. Exaggerating for emphasis, it often 
seems as though IR scholars can essentially be divided into two general groups: one 
viewing the grand theories as being incredibly important and therefore worthy of inves-
tigation, the other seeing them essentially as a distraction from what they regard as the 
real business of IR: creating and evaluating middle-range theories. In my view, both of 
these positions are wrong: I favor a stance which mediates between them. With the par-
tisans of grand theorizing, I believe that explicit theoretical work of this sort is useful; 
our understanding of international relations will be weaker if we neglect grand theoriz-
ing. But with the partisans of middle-range theory, I concur that a search for a single 
overarching grand theory to guide inquiry is misguided and that the primary business of 
IR is, in fact, to form and evaluate middle-range theories.
The role of (grand) theory
Theories can obviously be helpful in a number of ways; of the various tasks they can 
perform, there are five I will briefly highlight which are particularly relevant for 
understanding the role of grand theorizing in the IR field. Drawing on an explicit 
theory (1) helps us to select certain variables for investigation out of an endless num-
ber of potential causal factors, (2) pushes us to state our underlying assumptions 
directly, (3) gives us clues as to the type of causal connections to establish and directs 
us toward certain kinds of phenomena to investigate, (4) encourages us to identify 
variables and develop hypotheses that are consistent with each other, and (5) makes it 
easier to distinguish our hypotheses from competing ones – including competing 
hypotheses that feature the same independent variable – that are drawn from different 
underlying assumptions. These five tasks are obviously not the only roles that theo-
ries can play, but a theory can be incredibly valuable merely if it performs them and 
does nothing else.
At the level of grand theory in IR, I maintain that these five tasks are all that such 
theories should try to accomplish. Viewed this way, grand theory ultimately just tells us 
‘where to look’ for explanations of international relations and to be explicit about the 
choices we make in this regard. This is a much more limited function for grand theoriz-
ing than has typically been propounded by its proponents in the discipline. In particular, 
many advocates of grand theorizing either implicitly or explicitly subscribe to the view 
that it can explain behavior on its own; this becomes clearest when IR scholars try to use 
the assumptions of their preferred grand theory to explain state behavior.
Pushing grand theory to accomplish more than the five tasks specified above does 
great harm: it ineluctably leads to debates over which grand theory would be best off 
adopting as the standard, or, alternatively, over which grand theory in the aggregate is 
‘most useful’ at explaining international behavior. But if the purpose of grand theory is 
merely to accomplish the above five tasks, then there would be no point in seeking to 
establish one particular grand theory as ‘King of the Hill’.
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The value of Robert Merton’s perspective
Robert Merton comes closest to specifying the minimalist role for grand theorizing that 
I have in mind. That I turn to Merton in this regard will strike many readers as highly 
ironic, since he is arguably the most ardent defender of middle-range theory in the social 
sciences (he, in fact, coined the term).5 And yet, in making his argument for emphasizing 
middle-range theory, Merton outlines a key caveat:
it is theories of the middle-range which hold the largest promise, provided that, underlying this 
modest search for social uniformities, there is an enduring and pervasive concern with 
consolidating the special theories into a more general set of concepts and mutually consistent 
propositions.6
But what prompts such concerns for consolidation? And what pushes analysts to 
choose certain variables for investigation as well as to formulate propositions so as to be 
mutually consistent with each other? Here, Merton underscores the vital importance of a 
different form of theorizing – what he calls ‘general theoretical orientations’ – which he 
argues
have great propaedeutic value. For one thing, they bring out into the open air for all to see the 
array of assumptions, concepts and basic propositions employed … If true art consists in 
concealing all signs of art, true science consists in revealing its scaffolding as well as its finished 
structure.7
Moreover, Merton outlines a number of reasons why general theoretical orientations 
facilitate the creation and evaluation of middle-range theories, notably (1) they point to 
certain types of variables to be taken into account; (2) they provide a compact arrange-
ment of the central concepts and assumptions that are used – thereby making it possible 
for these concepts and assumptions that are used in the analysis to be evaluated all at 
once, both by the analyst and by potential critics;8 (3) they ‘direct the attention of research 
workers to different kinds of phenomena through which each array of problems can be 
investigated to good advantage’;9 (4) they facilitate ‘the systematic cross-tabulation of 
presumably significant concepts’;10 and (5) they promote internal consistency and cumu-
lation, since they make it easier to detect when a middle-range theory is developed from 
the original set of assumptions and, alternatively, when a middle-range theory is devel-
oped only by extending or changing the original set of assumptions.11
While not identical, the functions that Merton outlines for what he calls general theo-
retical orientations are very similar to the five roles I laid out above for grand theorizing 
in IR. This is no accident, of course, since I was influenced by Merton’s arguments to this 
effect. In Merton’s view – and mine – what in IR we call grand theories are best used 
‘tentatively, as a point of departure’.12 As Merton notes,
[i]ndispensable though these [general theoretical] orientations are, they provide only the 
broadest framework for empirical inquiry … The chief function of these orientations is to 
provide a general context for inquiry; they facilitate the progress of arriving at determinate 
hypotheses … [T]hey constitute only the point of departure for the theorist. It is his task to 
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develop specific, interrelated hypotheses by reformulating empirical generalization in light of 
these generic orientations.13
Consistent with Merton’s perspective, grand theorizing has value in our quest to 
understand international relations, but it should have a highly constrained role: perform-
ing the five tasks specified above, which collectively help to promote the formation and 
evaluation of middle-range theories. Expecting grand theories to do more than simply 
accomplish the above tasks distracts us from examining the explanatory power of mid-
dle-range theories and toward ‘King of the Hill’ consolidation exercises. At the level of 
middle-range theory, debate is necessary for progress. But the necessity of this kind of 
debate at the level of middle-range theory by no means requires searching for a particular 
grand theory which can best organize the field.
Theoretical pluralism
In many respects, a minimalist approach to grand theorizing automatically feeds into a 
respect for theoretical pluralism; it is thus not surprising that Merton strongly endorses 
its value.14 If grand theorizing is merely a tool in the development and assessment of 
middle-range theories, then having different alternatives will actually be helpful for sci-
entific progress.
Karl Popper arguably underscores this point better than anyone else, maintaining 
that it would be a grave mistake to have all scientists in a field working within the same 
theoretical framework since this would impair creativity, which is the essence of sci-
ence in his understanding. In his writings, Popper emphasizes the overriding impor-
tance of permanent open critical discussion, stressing that a researcher should always 
seek out discussion with those in disagreement with them and be prepared to change 
their views following these conversations; in his view, having a range of contrasting 
general theoretical frameworks both encourages and facilitates such discussions. As 
Popper maintains,
It is often asserted that discussion is only possible between people who have a common 
language and accept common basic assumptions. I think this is a mistake. All that is needed is 
a readiness to learn from one’s partner in the discussion, which includes a genuine wish to 
understand what he intends to say. If this readiness is there, the discussion will be the more 
fruitful the more the partners’ backgrounds differ. Thus the value of a discussion depends 
largely on the variety of the competing views. Had there been no Tower of Babel, we should 
invent it.15
Conclusion
The great value of Justin Rosenberg’s recent article is that it bravely seeks to strengthen 
the theoretical foundations of the IR discipline. We need more such attempts at bold, 
sweeping theorizing. Provided that Rosenberg’s theoretical effort can be made compati-
ble with the minimalist understanding of the role of grand theorizing outlined here, then 
I think his contribution will have great value indeed.
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